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Abstract—Self-managed systems need to adapt to changes in
requirements and in operational conditions. New components or
services may become available, others may become unreliable or
fail. Non-functional aspects, such as reliability or other quality-of-
service parameters usually drive the selection of new architectural
configurations. However, in existing approaches, the link between
non-functional aspects and software models is established through
manual annotations that require human intervention on each
re-configuration and adaptation is enacted through fixed rules
that require anticipation of all possible changes. We propose
here a methodology to automatically re-assemble services and
component-based applications to preserve their reliability. To
achieve this we define architectural and behavioural models
that are composable, account for non-functional aspects and
correspond closely to the implementation. Our approach enables
autonomous components to locally adapt and control their inter-
nal configuration whilst exposing interface models to upstream
components.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-managed systems need to adapt their configuration at
run-time to changes in requirements or in the components from
which they are assembled. This is equally true in pervasive
embedded systems or service-based distributed architectures
where new devices or services may become available and
existing ones may degrade or fail.
Current approaches to adaptation and re-assembly rely on
pre-defined event-condition-action rules [1], [2], extensions
of design models with simplified representations [3]–[6] or
non-composable models of non-functional properties [7], [8].
They require either anticipating all possible reconfigurations
or manual input from system designers to re-model the non-
functional properties of the system. How can we then move
towards automation?
An essential aspect is the compositionality of the models
i.e., the ability to derive the representation of composite com-
ponents from the representations of their parts. This must apply
to the components’ architectural, behavioural and management
aspects and to the representation of their non-functional as-
pects. Only then can we calculate the aggregated properties
of configurations in order to select between alternative ones
[4], [6], [9]. Non-functional properties are often probabilistic
and composing probabilistic models is difficult. Although
performance models such as PEPA [10] are compositional,
they impose a semantics based on the duration of actions and
have limited representations for failures, their propagation and
handling. In addition, they allow answering questions such as
“what is the probability that the system fails within s units of
time?” or “what is the average time until the system fails?”.
In contrast, we focus on the reliability of the system
interpreted as the reachability of a failure states, represent
failures, their propagation and handling in a natural way, and
answer questions such as “what is the probability that the
system fails?” or “what is the probability of failure after action
a?”. For this purpose we have defined the Probabilistic Com-
ponent Automata (PCA) [11], which support the automatic
construction of composite representations and advanced failure
representation. Both PEPA and PCA may suffer from state-
explosion when composing models, which hinders their ability
for analysing large systems. We therefore defined an algorithm
based on Compositional Reachability Analysis [12] to help
mitigate the state explosion by reducing the size of composite
PCA models.
In this paper we show how PCAs can be used effectively for
distributed assembly of autonomous components. We propose
a distributed assembly algorithm to automatically select re-
configurations that maximise the system’s reliability. We com-
pare a centralised and a distributed version of the algorithm
using an example application scenario. We further show how
this algorithm can be applied as part of a more general method-
ology that encompasses model extraction and analysis and that
integrates architectural, behavioural and management views
of application components. Our methodology is applicable to
component-based systems and services alike. We only assume
that required and provided interfaces can be identified and
probabilities of transitions can be extracted from monitoring
and profiling logs. These constitute the main contributions of
this paper and are presented in Sections III and IV. We also
review related approaches from Software Engineering and Sys-
tems Management in Section II and evaluate the performance
of the assembly algorithms in Section V. Conclusions are
presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Architectural adaptation consists in changing the bindings
between components or replacing the components (services)
themselves. Several approaches associate non-functional pa-
rameters with components and select configuration changes
based on aggregated measures of the non-functional parameters
of their components. Sykes et al. [9] consider the components
independently, Grassi et al. [4]; extend theis to account for
dependencies between components. But neither consider the
behavioural aspects, which are necessary to assess the system’s
reliability. Indeed, a component’s reliability depends on how
and which parts of its behaviour are used. Feature driven
models [5], [6] consider alternative implementations that can
be changed at run-time. But they are not composable and
cannot be easily analysed.
Across most existing approaches non-functional properties
are, in essence, manually defined annotations. Although in [7]
DTMC models of the system are updated at runtime, this ap-
proach treats components as black-boxes and the DTMC model
of a composite component cannot be automatically constructed
from models of its sub-components. Thus, a new DTMC has
to be manually defined for each architectural configuration. In
contrast, PCA [11] supports automatic construction of com-
posite representations and this enables analysing and selecting
the most appropriate configuration automatically. Showing how
this is achieved is one of the aims of this paper.
The integration of previous approaches with management
aspects is also limited. Self-management frameworks im-
plement variations of a MAPE loop (Monitoring, Analysis,
Planning and Execution). The Self-Managed Cell (SMCs) [1]
supports distributed and composable autonomous components
through Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policies. Rainbow [2]
integrates architectural models with ECA policies that change
system parameters on the basis of their costs and benefits
given as annotations. But in such systems changes must be
anticipated in advance when policies are defined.
We build here upon our PCA formalism to show how
component re-assembly can be self-managed and automated
based on both architectural and behavioural models. PCA
models can, to a large extent, be extracted from the software
implementation. Their transitions are probabilistic and can be
derived from system execution and profiling logs. They can
represent failure handling and failure propagation to express
reliability concerns. PCA models are composable and can be
reduced to a component’s interface behaviour. This allows us
to analyse models to compare architectural configurations and
select the most appropriate one. We show hereafter how re-
assembly can be achieved in a distributed fashion where each
component autonomously decides on its internal configuration.
III. NOTATIONAL ELEMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTED
ARCHITECTURAL ADAPTATION
Component-based models can be reconfigured by changing
the bindings between provided and required interfaces. We use
component in a generic sense to denote encapsulation of be-
haviour. Components could equally well be libraries, hardware
devices or (web) services. We assume that components are
composable i.e. a composite component is realised as a con-
figuration of sub-components. When multiple configurations
achieve the desired functional behaviour, non-functional prop-
erties such as reliability or other quality-of-service parameters
are used to select the configuration to deploy. Management
services monitor system behaviour, measure non-functional
parameters and enact reconfiguration changes to preserve the
system’s quality of service or reliability. Component-based
applications and services can therefore be seen from an ar-
chitectural, behavioural or management perspective.
A. Architectural View
The architectural view comprises the components with their
provided and required interfaces and their bindings; for com-
posite components, sub-components and internal bindings are
also specified. Components provide encapsulation of behaviour
and autonomy: each component can be seen as managing its
internal configuration of sub-components and adapting it to
achieve the required reliability. Similarly to [9], we use a
notation based on Darwin [20] to graphically represent the
architecture of the application. Other notations exist and are
broadly equivalent. However, in contrast to [9] we derive non-
functional parameters such as the reliability of a composite
component are automatically derived from the models of its
sub-components.
B. Behavioural view
The behavioural view comprises the representation of the
components’ probabilistic behaviour described as PCAs [11].
We distinguish between generative transitions which model
internal actions or output actions and reactive transitions
that correspond to input actions exposed through a provided
interface. Tool support for PCA representation and analysis
is presented in [21]. Formally, a PCA is defined as P =
hS, q, E , , µi where:
• S is a set of states and q 2 S is the initial state;
• E = E in [ E loc: E in are input actions that follow reactive
semantics; E loc = E int [ Eout are locally controlled
actions that follow generative semantics, where E int and
Eout are internal actions and output actions, respectively;
•   ✓ (S ⇥ E ⇥ S) is the set of transitions.
• µ :   ! [0, 1] where µ(s, a, s0) denotes the probability
of reaching state s0 from state s through the execution of
action a.
PCA models correspond therefore closely to the architec-
tural models. They also correspond closely to the source code,
thus producing a faithful representation of the implementation.
In essence, an output action corresponds to calling an external
method, whereas input actions correspond to methods of a
component’s interface being called.
We introduce failure actions to model failure scenarios,
failure propagation and failure handling in a manner that is
analogous to the conventional use of exceptions in object-
oriented programming languages. If a PCA is in state s and
can execute an unreliable internal action e, a failure transition
(s,⇠ e,ERROR) leading to the ERROR state represents the
failure of e. While internal failures represent unexpected
executions such as runtime exceptions, output failure actions
(s,⇠!e,ERROR) model externally visible failures such as
communication failures, and input failure actions correspond
to the handling of an output failure; details are given in [11].
The behaviour representation of composite components is
automatically constructed as the parallel composition of the
models of its sub-components. Input and output actions are
synchronised to model interactions between two components,
and internal actions are interleaved to model concurrent exe-
cution.
In the architectural view, the interfaces of a component hide
its internal behaviour. Similarly, when applied to a PCA A,
the hiding operator \{a1, . . . , an} collapses, when possible,
transitions in A labelled with actions {a1, . . . , an}, while
maintaining the probabilistic reachability properties of the
original process. Hiding can be used to remove behaviour
associated with unbound provided interfaces, internal transi-
tions or reduce a PCA to its interface behaviour. Its dual, the
interface operator @ {a1, . . . , an}, indicates the transitions
that should be kept and is equivalent to \
n
EA   {a1, . . . ,
an}
o
. We have defined a probabilistic extension of the CRA
algorithm to implement the hiding and interface operators; for
further details see [11].
We have implemented PCAs in the LTSA tool which we
have extended to automatically construct composite repre-
sentations from the PCA models of each component [21] .
This allows us to construct and analyse models for composite
components and entire systems. In the latter case, when the
composite PCA is closed i.e., it does not have any unbound
input interfaces, the PCA model can be translated to a DTMC
model which we then analyse with the PRISM model checker
[22] to determine its reliability. Sensitivity analysis on the
translated model can determine the impact of changes on:
a) the probability of failure of a component; b) clients exe-
cution profile and c) bindings configuration.
C. Management View
While the architectural view represents the components,
their interfaces and bindings, and the behavioural view mod-
els the probabilistic state transitions and their reachability,
the management view concerns maintaining the component
inventory, monitoring component execution to calculate the
state transition probabilities, detecting violations of desirable
properties, as well as deciding upon and performing re-
configuration.
Components can be self-managed i.e. implementing their
own management services and managing their own internal
configuration of sub-components, we refer to reconfiguration
in this case as distributed assembly (section IV), or can be
managed by an external management system which determines
the reconfiguration of a whole component hierarchy in a
centralised case (section IV-A).
1) Monitoring: Monitoring the execution of a component
is necessary to update the transitions probabilities µ in the
behavioural models of all transitions including failures.
2) Instance Inventory: Re-configuring a system requires
knowing at all times which components are available and
thus maintaining an inventory of available components and
their characteristics. Typically, this requires discovering new
components when they become available and detecting their
failure or absence.
3) Decision-Making: When re-configuration is needed to
preserve reliability requirements, a decision-making function
is necessary to identify the changes to make. In our case, this
entails selecting re-configurations that are most reliable and
meet reliability requirements.
IV. NON-FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURAL ASSEMBLY
Automating architectural assembly requires determining
the possible alternative configurations based on the available
components, calculating their reliability properties and choos-
ing the most reliable configuration that satisfies requirements.
Calculating the reliability properties of a configuration requires
in turn: reducing the PCA model of each component to its
interface representation using the hiding operator and then
constructing the composite model from the reduced models
of the components.
In the following, we contrast centralised assembly with
distributed assembly. In the latter, each component behaves au-
tonomously, computes its internal most reliable configuration
and exchanges its interface models with other components.
A. Centralised Assembly
Consider a set of available components C = {C1, . . . , Cn},
where each Ci is associated with a set of provided interfaces
PCi = { p1, ..., pn} and a set of required interfaces RCi ={ r1, ..., rn}. An architectural configuration is then defined by
the set of components Carch and the bindings between their
provided and required interfaces Barch = {Ci.pj    Ck.rj},
where Ci.pj (Ck.rj) denotes the provided (required) interface
pj (rj) of component Ci (Ck). The probabilistic behaviour of
component Ci is then defined by the PCA: ACi = hSCi , qCi ,ECi ,  Ci , µCii.
The possible architectural configurations can be obtained
from the available component instances C by using a con-
straint solver [9]. For each configuration arch, if the pro-
vided interfaces of the components in Carch are all bound
to required interfaces of components in Carch, then the com-
posite behavioural representation for arch is given by the
parallel composition of the PCA models of its components:
AC1k . . . kACn , ACi 2 Carch, i 2 {1, . . . , n}, n = #(Carch).
However, in general, not all provided interfaces may be
bound as some functionality may not be used. We therefore
reduce ACi to an interface model based upon the bound
interfaces of Ci using the hiding operator. If B(C) denotes
the interfaces of component C used in configuration B, and
E(C.i) the set of actions of interface i in component C, then
the interface process of C for configuration B is given by:
IC = AC \
⇣
EC  
[
i2B(C)
E(C.i)
⌘
.
Thus, the hiding operator is used to produce for each compo-
nent C in arch a representation consistent with the bindings
in Barch. This reduces significantly the size of the composite
model as it removes all interleaving of internal and unbound
transitions; we have obtained reductions in size of around
90% that translate in reduced complexity and shorter analysis
time. If arch does not have unbound provided interfaces, the
composite PCA can be translated into a DTMC for reliability
analysis based upon the reachability of failure states [11].
Fig. 1. Example Web system
Consider a simple Web system (Figure 1) consisting of a
Client that requests pages from a Server, which uses a back-
end infrastructure to obtain dynamic text content and images.
The backend is implemented as a composite component that
relies on two databases (DB-1 and DB-2). This system is
instantiated with the following bindings configuration B1:
Server.getWebPage    Client.getWebPage
Backend-1.getImage    Server.getImage
Backend-1.getContent    Server.getContent
Backend-1.getContentDB    DB1.getContentDB
Backend-1.getImageDB    DB2.getImageDB
Since there are no unbound interfaces, its composite PCA
representation can be obtained as the parallel composition of
AClient,AServer and ABackend-1. When a new component
Backend-2 that provides images from a separate database
DB-3 becomes available, the following alternative configu-
ration can be considered B2 (Figure 2):
Server.getWebPage    Client.getWebPage
Backend-2.getImage    Server.getImage
Backend-2.getImageDB    DB3.getImageDB
Backend-1.getContent    Server.getContent
Backend-1.getContentDB    DB1.getContentDB
Fig. 2. Example Web system - alternative configuration
Both Backend-1 and Backend-2 provide the getImage
interface but the Server’s getImage required interface is only
bound to Backend-2. So before constructing the composite
representation for B2 through the parallel composition of
AClient,AServer,ABackend-1 and ABackend-2 the PCA rep-
resentation of Backend-1 needs to be reduced to include only
the interfaces used in B2:
IBackend-1 = ABackend-1 \
 E(getImage) [ E intBackend-1  .
The reliability of B1 and B2 can now be calculated based on
the reachability of failure states in the composite representation
and the best configuration can be selected.
B. Distributed Assembly
Centralised assembly assumes that a central point knows
all components, their architecture, configuration and behaviour.
However, in many cases components need to make au-
tonomously local re-configuration decisions. This requires
them to exchange information regarding their interfaces and
behaviour so that each component can analyse its resulting
reliability properties. We propose here an algorithm for dis-
tributed re-assembly (Algorithm 1), which is discussed later
in this section. We start however by illustrating it in the case
of the Web system example.
The initial components Client, Server and Backend-1,
have a single possible configuration given in B1. Therefore,
in the initial run of the algorithm, each component sends to
the components that can be bound to its required interfaces
a reduced PCA model, which describes how it uses their
1 {ICu , RCu} = receive (Cu)
2 IC Cu = AC \
n
EC  
⇣
EICu [
S
j2RC E(j)
⌘o
3 IC = IC Cu k ICu
4 R0C = ;
5 foreach r 2 RC do
6 if E(r) \ EIC 6= ; then
7 add r to R0C
8
9 maxReliability =  1
10 BmaxReliability = ;
11 Cavailable = availableComponentInstances ()
12 foreach B 2 permutations (Cavailable,R0C) do
13 AB = IC
14 foreach Cl 2 B do
15 IC Cl = IC \
⇣
EC  
S
i2B(Cl)
⌘
16 send (IC Cl , Cl)
17 ICl = receive (Cl)
18 AB = AB k ICl
19
20 reliabiliyAB = reliability(AB)
21 if reliabiliyAB > maxReliability then
22 maxReliability = reliabiliyAB
23 BmaxReliability = B
24
25 if PC 6= ;
26 IC = IC Cu k ICl1 k ... k ICln , ICli 2BmaxReliability
27 I 0C = IC \
⇣
EIC   EICu
⌘
28 send (I 0C , Cu)
Algorithm 1: Distributed Assembly Algorithm
provided interfaces. When Backend-2 becomes available, the
Server can consider the following alternative bindings to its
required interfaces (Algorithm 1 - line 11):
ServerB1 =
Backend-1.getImage  Server.getImage,
Backend-1.getContent  Server.getContent
ServerB2 =
Backend-2.getImage  Server.getImage
Backend-1.getContent  Server.getContent
The reliability of each configuration is then analysed by
the Server based on how its provided service is used by the
Client (algorithm 1 - line 3). The behavioural representation
for B1 has been calculated in the first run so we describe the
steps to calculate that for B2 referring to the relevant lines
in Algorithm 1. The Server first uses the hiding operator to
compute its PCA representation for each component bound
to it in B2 (line 15) i.e. to Backend-1 and Backend-2 and
sends it to them (line 16). For instance, the representation
for Backend-1 denotes how the Server uses the getContent
interface.
Backend-1 receives the reduced PCA from Server (line
1), and uses it to construct a PCA representation of its
behaviour as used by the server and its required interfaces (line
2). It applies the hiding operator to remove the behaviour of its
unbound provided interfaces (i.e. methods that are not called
such as getImage). It then identifies which of its required
interfaces need to be bound (lines 4-7) and the components that
can provide them. In our example it requires DB-1 to provide
getContentDB but not DB-2 to provide getImageDB.
Backend-1 then sends DB-1 a reduced PCA representation
which denotes how it uses the interface getContent, given
how itself is used by the Server (lines 15-16). DB-1 is a leaf
component, i.e. it does not have required interfaces, so replies
sending its interface PCA representation for Backend-1 (lines
27 and 28). This allows Backend-1 to compute its behaviour
representation given its downstream dependencies (DB-1)
reduce it to its interface representation w.r.t to the Server
(line 26) and send it to the Server. Backend-2 performs
similar steps to provide its behaviour (given its downstream
dependences) to the Server.
Having received the representations from Backend-1 and
Backend-2 (line 17) for the configuration B2, the Server can
combine them with its own behaviour to compute the compos-
ite representation for B2 (line 18). This representation is closed
i.e. all interfaces are bound, can therefore be translated to a
DTMC to calculate the resulting system reliability properties
for each of the configurations (line 20). The Server is then
ready to compare the reliability of the configurations B2 and
B1, which had been previously calculated. Since B2 achieves a
higher reliability than B1, it is chosen by the Server who then
calculates a composite representation w.r.t. to the interfaces
used by Client (lines 26 and 27) and sends it to the Client.
C. General algorithm description
In the general case, the distributed assembly algorithm
starts a descending phase from a component C1 with no
provided interfaces, i.e. the root of a composition hierarchy.
C1 calculates all its possible bindings given its required
interfaces and available sub-components and sends to each
sub-component and for each configuration, its the behaviour
model dictating how it would use their provided interfaces.
This descending phase is repeated and stops when leaf com-
ponents are reached. An ascendent phase is then started where
each component selects the configuration that maximises its
reliability, and propagates that choice upwards in the hierarchy.
These computations do not need to be repeated at each
configuration change. For example, if a component C becomes
unavailable, the component(s) that used C have to select an
alternative configuration to meet their functional requirements.
As these components instances have calculated all the possible
configurations w.r.t. to their required interfaces (lines 11-22),
no computation is required for downstream dependencies.
However, as the new configuration is less reliable, these
component instances need to send their new reduced PCA to
their upstream dependencies (lines 24-26), which may trigger
changes in the configuration of upstream composite compo-
nents. Similarly, when a new component C becomes available,
existing component instances that can use its functionality can
select a configuration with better reliability and send it to their
upstream dependencies.
When the execution profile of a component C changes,
the transition probabilities in its PCA model and consequently
the reliability of the configurations involving C. To calculate
the new reliability values, C constructs a new reduced PCA
(line 2) and propagates the new representation first to down-
stream dependencies (lines 3 - 23), and then to the upstream
components that use its provided interfaces.
Although the same PCA model of a component is used
in all configurations and restricted using the hiding operator,
the reliability provided by a component differs in each con-
figuration as it is determined by how the component is used
by upstream components and the reliability provided by its
downstream dependencies. For example, a component may fail
on a specific action with a high probability but that action
may be rarely used in a given configuration so will not have
a significant impact. While the probability of a transition is
given by the component’s execution profile, the frequency
with which it is called also depends on the probability with
which relevant component interfaces are called. Therefore, a
component’s reliability is always w.r.t. a particular configura-
tion. The descending phase of the algorithm ensures that each
component knows how it is going to be used by upstream
components and the hiding operator ensures that only interface
actions are exchanged between components. In the ascend-
ing phase, the composite representation computed contains
the propagation and handling of failures from downstream
dependencies. So the reliability of downstream dependents is
combined with the execution profile of upstream components
propagated during the descending phase and each component
has all the information required.
V. EVALUATION
Of particular interest is the overhead introduced by the dis-
tributed re-assembly algorithm since it computes intermediate
representations at each descending and ascending step. We use
the centralised algorithm as a baseline for comparison.
In the centralised algorithm selecting the most reliable
configuration is based on the composite representation of
all components in each configuration. Thus we measure the
time required to construct and analyse each configuration
individually and the total time denotes the time required to
compute all configurations sequentially (results in Table I).
The distributed algorithm recursively constructs the in-
termediate representations that enable local choice at each
component with alternative configurations for its required
interfaces. In contrast with the centralised case, the time to
construct each configuration denotes the time to construct
all the intermediate representations, for both the descending
and the ascending phases until the Server can select the
configuration with the highest reliability. Note however that
some of the computations could be done concurrently as
the components are distributed. Nevertheless, for comparison
purposes, we place ourselves in the worst case scenario and
compute sequentially the intermediate PCA representations for
B1 and B2. We ignore the network delay for transmitting the
intermediate representations as such delays are dependent on
the deployment context and the size of the reduced models is
small (results in Table I).
Although this is only small example and further evaluation
at larger scales is certainly needed, the figures suggest that
the overheads of computing intermediate representations are
not prohibitive and can be easily compensated if the compo-
nents execute concurrently. This is due to the fact that each
Centralised Distributed
Configuration B1 59ms 89ms
Configuration B2 54ms 92ms
Total 113ms 223ms
TABLE I. ARCHITECTURAL ASSEMBLY EVALUATION RESULTS
component’s behaviour has been reduced to its interface rep-
resentation which remains small. Indeed, constructing reduced
interface models offers significant gains over the use of full
behavioural models that suffer from state explosion [11].
Another important aspect of reducing the behaviour to
interface models is that it allows the suppliers of different
autonomous components such as hardware devices to exchange
models that do not expose their underlying (and often propri-
etary implementations), which cannot be removed from the
PCA representation of such components as it is necessary to
monitor the execution profile of internal computations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
(Self-) adaptation of autonomous systems, whether dis-
tributed applications or services is driven by non-functional
aspects that need to be automatically (rather than manually)
associated with their software models. This requires an inte-
gration between the architectural, behavioural and management
concerns. Models that ignore one of them - for example
information models tend to ignore behavioural aspects - must
rely on user input and pre-defined scenarios of change. We
ensure, a close correspondence between the elements of the
different views: bindings and synchronised actions, provided
(required) actions and reactive (generative) transitions, execu-
tion monitoring and transition probabilities.
Compositionality of models – deriving a composite model
from the models of its parts – is a key requirement for
autonomous systems to be able to reason and adapt. However,
non-functional aspects are often probabilistic and composing
probabilistic models can be challenging. We have introduced
PCA to address some of the shortcomings of existing models
and to be able to represent failures, their propagation and
handling.
Self-management, requires encapsulation of the compo-
nents’ internal behaviour. This is needed for commercial as
well as technical reasons: internal behaviour should not be
disclosed. But reducing probabilistic models to their interface
behaviour can be challenging. For example, when deleting a
probabilistic transition where should its probability be propa-
gated? Our algorithm for reducing probabilistic models forms
an important part of our solution.
When architectural, behavioural and management models
are integrated, when models are composable and can be
reduced to their interfaces, it is possible for systems made
of autonomous components to re-configure themselves to pre-
serve global non-functional requirements. We have focused in
this paper on reliability analysis based on reachability of failure
states but other non-functional properties can be similarly
represented.
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